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THE INNOCENT PASSAGE OF WARSHIPS
IN FOREIGN TERRITORIAL SEAS:
A THREATENED FREEDOM
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Conti-
guous Zone was understood by many nations, including the
United States, to have established a right of innocent passage
through territorial waters for military vessels. Many
loopholes, however, enabled a growing number of coastal
States to derogate this right with the requirement of advance
permission for warship passage. This Comment explores and
criticizes the fundamental contentions of each camp regard-
ing the disputed regime. The author relates the topic of war-
ships to analogous problems involving innocent passage. This
doctrine, he concludes, will be insufficient to guarantee the
free deployment of military vessels in the territorial seas of
the modern world.
INTRODUCTION
International law recognizes that "[t]he sovereignty of a State
extends, beyond its land territory and its internal waters, to a belt of
sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea."' But a
coastal nation's right to control the passage of foreign ships through
these waters has historically been a controversial issue.
The world community has always sought to preserve foreign ship-
ping rights incident to ordinary navigation in the territorial sea. For
purposes of regulating shipping in this area, however, coastal States
have long distinguished foreign merchant vessels from vessels of war.
Merchantmen are subject to minimal coastal regulation, whereas a
right of passage for foreign warships through the territorial sea has
been a source of friction among nations for centuries.
"Innocent passage" is a principle of international law of the sea
which purports to allow the movement of all ships on peaceful mis-
sions through foreign territorial waters without restriction.2 At least
this appears to be the meaning of the concept as describedin the 1958
1. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, art. 1(1), done
at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
2. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra
note 1. Rules Applicable to All Ships, id., art. 14(l)(A), provides: "Subject to the
provisions of these articles, ships of all States, whether coastal or not, shall
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.3
However, the theory has been advanced by an increasing number of
coastal States that warships should give prior notice and receive
authorization before passage is allowed. To maintain this contention
is to deny the right of innocent passage to military craft, and hence,
to threaten the effectiveness of the world's great naval powers.
How exactly do coastal States manifest in practice their desires to
regulate the passage of warships through their territorial waters? Are
such steps legally in accord with international custom? These
controversial issues will be discussed in light of their historical back-
ground. Some current implications will also be explored. The conclu-
sion reflects the fear of modern jurists that recent attempts to clarify
the disputed regime will achieve little in saving the concept of the
innocent passage of warships from ultimate extinction.
BACKGROUND
The Draft Articles on Innocent Passage
Prior to codification of the Law of the Sea, the primary sources of
standards for coastal State regulation of foreign navigation were the
views of jurists, theorists, and publicists. One such scholar asserted
that a State's sovereignty extended to its territorial sea only with
regard to security, political and fiscal, and economic interests.4 Re-
pugnant to this notion was the claim of "absolute sovereignty." 5 Still
others had alluded to the coastal State's possession of a "bundle of
servitudes"6 in the territorial sea.
The need for clarity and consistency of these interests gave rise to a
community effort to establish an international body of law. But the
Draft Articles prepared for the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference
clearly illustrate the confusion and disagreement over the regime of
foreign warships. It is not surprising that the endless debate over
their "right" of innocent passage has affected the consistency of legal
development.
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea." See also 4 M.
WnrsMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 350 (1965).
3. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, note 1 supra.
See authorities cited note 2 supra.
4. J. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 87 (4th ed. 1959).
5. J. COLOMBOs, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 89 (6th ed. 1967).
6. De la Pradelle, 5 Rrv. G.NiRALE DROIT INT'L PUB. 264-84, 309-47 (1898),
cited in J. COLOMnOS, supra note 5, at 89.
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In 1929 the Comnmittee of Experts for the Progressive Codification
of International Law7 distributed internationally a questionnaire
pertaining to warships in foreign territorial seas. The majority of
governments which replied opined that military vessels possessed a
right of innocent passage as did all other ships. Only three States
denied the right-the United States, Bulgaria, and Poland.'
A proposal drafted at the 1930 Hague Conference9 stated: "As a
general rule, a Coastal State will not forbid the passage of foreign
warships in its territorial seas and will not require a previous author-
isation or notification. The Coastal State has the right to regulate the
conditions of such passage."'" A reasonable regulation was deemed
to be one which limited the number of foreign ships passing simulta-
neously."
Subsequently, in 1954, the International Law Commission (ILC)
agreed "that passage should be granted to warships without prior
authorization or notification."'1 2 In 1955, the ILC reversed itself,
however, and established the right of a State to insist upon such
requirements. The finished product of its negotiations was Draft
Article 24: "The coastal State may make the passage of warships
through the territorial sea subject to previous authorization or notifi-
cation. Normally it shall grant innocent passage .... ,,'3 The
commentary that followed is enlightening:
While it is true that a large number of States do not require previous
authorization or notification, the Commission can only welcome this
7. This committee was established by the Council of the League of Nations
to codify the law of the sea. 4 K. WrmTEmAN, supra note 2, at 347-48, 358-59.
8. League of Nations Doc. C.74.M.39. 1929 V., at 73, 75, reprinted in 4 M.
WHiTEMAN, supra note 2, at 359. Subcommittee I of the Second Commission
(Territorial Sea) dealt with the passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea.
The questionnaire was transmitted to governments by the Preparatory Commit-
tee prior to the 1930 Hague Conference. Id., at 365-66.
9. Conference for the Progressive Codification of International Law, held at
The Hague in 1930.
10. Report of the Second Commission (Territorial Sea) of the Hague Confer-
ence of 1930 for the Progressive Codification of International Law, League of
Nations Doc. C. 230. M. 117. 1930 V., art. 12, reprinted in 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra
note 2, at 410.
11. Id.
12. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 22-23, U.N. Doc. A/3159, art. 24 commentary (1) (1956),
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoM'N 253, 276, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER.
A/1956/Add. 1.
13. Id., art. 24, reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 276, U.N. Doc.
AICN. 4/SER. A/1956/Add. 1.
attitude, which displays a laudable respect for the principle of free-
dom of communications, but this does not mean that a State would not
be entitled to require such notification or authorization if it deemed it
necessary ... Since it admits that the passage of warships through
the territorial sea of another State can be considered by a State as a
threat to its security, and is aware of a number of States that do
require previous notification or authorization, the Commission is not
in a position to dispute the right... to take such a measure.
14
Countries which denied to warships a fundamental right of inno-
cent passage were no doubt pleased with this result. But the ILC did
not have the final word. A changing world was to spawn major
changes in ocean politics.
The Geneva Convention and the Emergence of United States Policy
Prior to 1945, United States policy was that warships did not
possess a right of innocent passage. In 1912, a United States delegate,
Elihu Root, stated that "[w]ar-ships may not pass without consent
into this zone because they threaten. Merchant-ships may pass and
repass, because they do not threaten."'" The negative response of the
United States to the 1929 Hague Questionnaire is additional evidence
of this policy. After World War II, however, "[t]he United States
emerged as the leading advocate of the right of innocent passage for
warships and the Soviet Union as the leading opponent."'16
At the forty-second meeting of the ILC in 1956, the United States
supported a German proposal to amend Draft Article 24 of the ILC to
delete the word "authorization."' 7 The proposal was the first sign of
a feasible compromise. It would have left intact a simple "notice"
standard. Hence, coastal States would not be empowered to deny
passage but would be entitled to have notice of the presence of
warships. Nevertheless, the proposal was defeated,' 8 and the Draft
Article was adopted unchanged by the ILC for submission at the 1958
Conference.
In Geneva, the tables suddenly turned. The United States, within
two years, was able to gain support in its resistance to the notice-
authorization dictate of the ILC. Following a now-favorable vote on
a Danish proposal to omit "authorization," even this amended ver-
sion of Draft Article 24 was struck down.19 Countries favoring re-
14. Id., commentary (2), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 277,
U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/1956/Add. 1.
15. 11 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration (United States v. Great
Britain) 2007 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1912) (Gov't Printing Off.).
16. D. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 139 (1975).
17. 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 2, at 415.
18. The proposal was defeated by a vote of 22-35-8. Id.
19. W. BUTLER, THE SOVIT UNION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 63-64 (1971); 4 Mvr.
WHITEmAN, supra note 2, at 416.
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strictions on innocent passage failed to muster the necessary two-
thirds majority.20 Neither notice nor authorization for warship pas-
sage was to be specifically required by international law.
Unfortunately, the victory of the United States was more illusory
than real. The omission of the notice provision created a myriad of
controversy. States seeking to relegate innocent passage of warships
to a privilege pointed to the broad regulatory powers now granted to
them in the new Convention. They asserted that the 1958 Convention
allowed (or at least did not preclude) the imposition of a notice-
authorization barrier.21
Article 17
Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply
with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in conform-
ity with these articles and other rules of international law .... 22
Article 23
If any warship does not comply with the regulations of the coastal
State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards
any request for compliance which is made to it, the coastal State may
require the warship to leave the territorial sea.23
These provisions were vague and set the stage for a multitude of
unilateral declarations by coastal States. Seven countries, following
the lead of the Soviet Union, submitted reservations to Article 23
upon signing the Treaty.24 These proclamations asserted the right to
demand notice-authorization. 25 The proponents of the reservations
argued that these requirements were necessary to dispel the ambi-
guities of the new Treaty and to embody the spirit of the ILC.
20. This proposal was defeated by a vote of 45-27-6. 4 M. WHrTEmAN, supra
note 2, at 416.
21. 1 V. SEBEK, THE EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF TIE
LAW OF THE SEA 299-300, 301 (1977).
22. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 1,
art. 17.
23. Id., art. 23. (emphasis added)
24. Declarations and Reservations to the Conventions, U.N. Doc. STILEG/
3/Rev. 1 (1962), reprinted in M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF
THE OCEANS 1180 (1965). The countries, in addition to the U.S.S.R., were the
Bulgarian S.S.R., Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the
Ukranian S.S.R. Id.
25. For example, see the reservation of the U.S.S.R.: "The government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics considers that a coastal State has the right
to establish procedures for the authorization of the passage of foreign warships
through its territorial waters." Id., art. 23, reprinted in M. McDoUGAL & W-
BURKE, supra note 24, at 1184.
Moreover, they believed that such "reservations" did not contravene
the intentions of the Conference.26
In resistance to notice-authorization, other readers of the Treaty
agreed that "[its] silence . . implies that the Conference did not
approve of Article 24 of the Report of the International Law Commis-
sion .... ,,2" They feared that "an unlimited power of exclusion
would subject a belligerent warship to intolerable interruption. '28
The United States, in particular, viewed the various "reservations"
as attempts to create exceptions. 29 Surely exceptions were not war-
ranted unless the Convention did approve of a right of innocent
passage for warships.30
A RIGHT OR A PRIVILEGE: THE BATTLE RAGES ON
The ambiguities of the 1958 Convention persisted long after the
initial disagreement. The consensus was that most ships of all nations
had a right to traverse through or anchor in the territorial sea while
navigating or in the event of distress or force majeure.3' Innocence
was broadly defined in Article 14 of the Convention as "not prejudi-
cial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. ' 32 But
the degree to which the passage of warships was qualified by coastal
State sovereignty was not settled. The formation of factions accord-
ing to political ideologies was the logical result.
Western powers, including the United States, France, and Great
Britain, argue that warships may pass innocently through foreign
territorial waters at any time.33 Clearly, the naval strength of these
nations and political commitment to the suppression of communism
contribute greatly to this outlook. The right is supported, they say, by
the fact that section HI, subsection A, of the 1958 Convention explic-
itly applies to all ships.34 Article 14 therein states that "ships of all
26. W. BUTLER, supra note 19, at 65:66.
27. J. COLOMBOS, supra note 5, at 262. See generally Harlow, Legal Aspects of
Claims to Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters, 23 NAVY JAG J. 81, 86 (Dec. 1968-
Jan. 1969) (Commander Harlow reaches the same basic conclusion).
28. J. COLOoMOS, supra note 5, at 260.
29. See W. BUTLER, supra note 19, at 65-66.
30. Id., at 66.
31. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 1,
art. 14(3). Force majeure is defined as "an event or effect that cannot reasonably
be anticipated or controlled." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
887 (1961).
32. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 1,
art. 14(4).
33. I. CHUNG, LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE CORFU CHANNEL INCIDENT 174
(1959); D. O'CoNNELL, supra note 16, at 139-40; 1 V. SEBEK, supra note 21, at 298.
34. Hearn, The Law of the Sea-The 1958 Geneva Conference, 1960 NAVY
JAG J. 3, 5 (Mar.-Apr. 1960). See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, supra note 1, § III(a) (Rules Applicable to All Ships).
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States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent
passage. ' ' 35 Furthermore, "as Article 14, paragraph 6... stipulates
that 'submarines are required to navigate on the surface and to show
their flag', it must be implied that they enjoy the right of innocent
passage under this condition.
'36
Jurists who support the above arguments frequently cite the Corfu
Channel Case,3 7 in which the International Court of Justice recog-
nized "that States in time of peace have a right to send their warships
through [international straits38] without previous authorization of a
coastal State, provided the passage is innocent."39 The pleadings of
the United Kingdom noted that "to demand notice of the passage of
warships through territorial waters when used merely as a channel of
navigation is contrary to the practice of civilized States. '40 Accord-
ingly, advocates of an unlimited right of innocent passage insist that
prior notice-authorization is too great a concession.
The Soviet Union, however, and nations such as Yugoslavia, Bul-
garia, Poland, East Germany, and Albania reject any claim of
"right," contending that innocent passage is merely a "privilege" or
"tolerance." 41 These East European States have traditionally main-
tained small coastal navies and fishing fleets. Unlike their western
adversaries, they have historically been incapable of deploying mili-
tary vessels in foreign waters. They have therefore resented the pres-
ence of such ships in their own seas. Their rule appears to be that
warships should not enjoy an absolute authority to pass through a
35. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 1,
art. 14(1).
36. 1 V. SEBEK, supra note 21, at 298 (emphasis added).
37. Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania) (Merits), [1949]
I.C.J. 4. On October 22, 1946, British warships were passing through the Corfu
Channel in Albanian territorial waters. Albania had earlier in that year fired on
British ships. Two ships were destroyed in the October 22 incident when they
struck mines secretly laid by the Albanian government. The lives of many
British seamen were lost. Both nations sought a resolution of the controversy by
the International Court of Justice. See 4 M. WHrrmAN, supra note 2, at 367, for
an excellent synopsis of the facts of the case.
38. International straits are those which are "used for international naviga-
tion between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the
territorial sea of a foreign State." Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, supra note 1, art. 16(4).
39. [1949] I.C.J. at 28 (emphasis original).
40. Memorial of United Kingdom, 1 Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Pleadings 45,
para. 88 (1949).
41. W. BUTLER, supra note 19, at 66; L. OPPENHEIm, INTERNATIONAL LAW 494,
853 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht (1955); 1 V. SEBEK, supra note 21, at 301.
State's territorial waters any more than an army could cross the land
territory.
42
The East European bloc strongly criticizes western jurists' in-
terpretation of the Corfu Channel Case. After all, when the court said
there was a "right to send warships. . . without previous authoriza-
tion . . . " they -were referring exclusively to the straits. There is
quite a distinction between these narrow waters and the much
broader territorial seas of which straits are a small part. The court
concluded that "it is unnecessary to consider the more general ques-
tion. . . whether States under international law have a right to send
warships in time of peace through territorial waters not included in a
strait." 4 But Judge Azevedo, dissenting in the Corfu Channel Case,
did consider this question. He noted that "all the arguments (in favor
of a 'right' of innocent passage in the territorial sea) are clouded in
confusion. . . sufficient to bar the recognition of a custom ... "45
He gave examples of nations which did require previous authoriza-
tion and condoned their power to do so. 46 He said that the Interna-
tional Court should be the authority of last resort for countries whose
warships were the objects of abuse.47
The East European bloc also argues that because the 1958 Conven-
tion requires all foreign ships to comply with the laws and regula-
tions of the coastal State,4 a requirement of notice-authorization
may legally be imposed. Where consent is not obtained, a State may
justifiably refuse passage altogether. 49
This position is somewhat anomalous because Article 17 calls for
compliance only with regulations that are "in conformity with these
articles and other rules of international law. . . ."50 A regulation
which derogates the established principle of innocent passage may
not satisfy this qualification. It also appears that the intent of Article
17 is primarily to allow the coastal State to control traffic safety. The
42. P. JESSUP, THE LAw OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION
120 (1927).
43. [1949] I.C.J. at 101.
44. Id. at 30.
45. Id. at 101.
46. I. CHUNG, LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE CORFU CHANNEL INCIDENT 183
(1959).
47. Id.
48. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 1,
arts. 17 & 23.
49. "Soviet legislation has the effect of denying rather than restricting the
right of innocent passage." W. BUTLER, supra note 19, at 66. The requirement of
30 days 4iotice in Article 16 of the Soviet Statute on the State Boundary and the
discretion to withhold authorization "transforms the passage of warships...
into a privilege." Id.
50. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 1,
art. 17.
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words "transport and navigation" are used to describe the rules a
State may make."' The ability of a State to exclude shipping
completely requires an unduly broad reading of Article 17.
Strong adherence to the distinction between warships and mer-
chant ships is found among the East European countries. The famous
United States clich6 that "warships threaten, '5 now embarassing to
western nations, is often cited as justification for the more severe
regulation of warship passage. Unlike merchantmen, men-of-war are
not directly connected with commerce. Hence, there is less reason for
their presence in the territorial sea to be tolerated.
5 3
This distinction appears to lack merit. It assumes that the right of
innocent passage through foreign territorial waters originated out of
the necessity of trade. But in the Corfu Channel Case, for example,
the British government emphasized that the right was "not merely
for the purpose of trade but for communication or navigation."5 4 The
court itself described innocent passage as "for the benefit of shipping
in general" or to permit "the freedom of maritime communication
without being limited to trade."5 5 Accordingly, because navigation is
vital to merchantmen and warships alike, freedom of movement
should be enjoyed by all.
Some East European writers even maintain that the passage of
warships can never be innocent.5 6 Certainly, the transit of foreign
military craft through territorial waters will to some degree affect
the "peace, good order and security" of the littoral State. It is equally
51. Id. Contra the view that although a State should regulate traffic safety
primarily, this limitation does not preclude a State from legally regulating other
areas. Article 17 merely calls for compliance "in particular, with such laws and
regulations relating to transport and navigation." Id. (emphasis added).
52. Statement of Elihu Root, United States delegate to the Atlantic Coast
Fisheries Arbitration of 1912, 11 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitra-
tion (United States v. Great Britain) 2007 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1912) (Gov't Printing
Off.)
53. J. COLO1MOS, supra note 5, at 261. The delegates to the 1958 Convention
must be presumed also to have recognized the distinction when they enunciated
separate rules to be applied to merchantmen and men-of-war. See Convention
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 1, § I (B) & (D).
54. I. CHUNG, LEGAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THE CORFU CHANNEL INCIDENT 185
(1959).
55. [19491 I.C.J. at 22.
56. E.g., Vukas, Problem Neskodljivog Prolaska Ratnog Broda (The Problem
of Innocent Passage of Warships), 1962 JUGOSLOVENSKA REVIJA ZA MEDUNAROD-
NO PRAVO 99, cited in 1 V. SEBEK, supra note 21, at 300.
plausible to suggest that the presence of destroyers only three miles
from shore will prove a serious threat to small nations.
57
Notwithstanding these arguments, the International Court of Jus-
tice disagreed when it decided the Corfu Channel Case. The passage
of warships through Albanian waters was held to be innocent, even
though political motives were present. 8 Generally, passage is not
prejudicial simply by the decree of the coastal State.59 If considera-
tions of flag, destination, or cargo are recognized as relevant factors,
the exercise of innocent passage would become a myth.60
All the above-mentioned arguments, though persuasive on both
sides, appear to be immune to actual resolution. Unhappily, the
conflict described between East and West is not harmlessly confined
to the theoretical. There is also wide divergence in practice between
those States which admit to the unrestricted passage of military
vessels and those which do not.
UNiLATERAL PRA TicEs: THE NEW VOGUE
Regardless of whether advance notice for the innocent passage of
warships has become a precept of international law, a growing num-
ber of nations are unilaterally asserting the right to regulate such
shipping. At first their notice-authorization regulations were not
stringently enforced. 61 As of 1975, however, it has been increasingly
57. J. COLOMBOS, supra note 5, at 261.
58. [1949] I.C.J. at 30-31.
[Flour warships-two cruisers and two destroyers-passed in this man-
ner, with crews at action stations, ready to retaliate quickly if fired
upon. They passed one after another through this narrow channel, close
to the Albanian coast, at a time of political tension in this region. The
intention must have been, not only to test Albania's attitude, but at the
same time to demonstrate such force that she would abstain from firing
again on passing ships. Having regard, however, to all the circum-
stances of the case, as described above, the Court is unable to charac-
terize these measures taken by the United Kingdom authorities as a
violation of Albania's sovereignty.
_Id.
59. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Jus-
tice: General Principles and Substantive Law, [1950] 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 1,
28-29 (1962).
(iii) In particular, passage does not cease to be innocent merely be-
cause its purpose is to test or assert a right disputed or wrongfully
denied by the coastal State.(iv) Where a right of passage exists, States are not bound to refrain
from exercising it because it is disputed and may be challenged or even
resisted by the coastal State.
Id. at 29.
60. Harlow, Legal Aspects of Claims to Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters, 23
NAVY JAG J. 81, 87 (Dec. 1968-Jan. 1969).
61. See generally 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 494 (8th ed. H. Lauter-
pacht 1955). The author remarks that as a practical matter, no State in
peacetime "normally opposes the passage of foreign naval vessels through its
maritime belt." This observation would be considered outdated today.
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common for coastal States to demand compliance. In that year, naval
vessels were forbidden to traverse the territorial waters without
express authorization in a number of jurisdictions, including: Al-
bania, Algeria, Brazil, Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Peo-
ple's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Poland, Somalia, Soviet Union,
Spain, Sudan and Syria. 2
Although prior notice-authorization has been the established prin-
ciple in these jurisdictions, in practice the demand has been met by
"notification at a low level."6 3 This practice is not universal, how-
ever, and the possibility remains that a military incident could arise
due to the adamant positions of some of the more powerful States.6 4
62. Official Albanian Decree No. 4650, art. 7, para. 1 (Mar. 9, 1970); Algerian
Decree No. 63-403, art. 2 (Oct. 12, 1963); Brazilian Decree No. 56.515, § 4 (June
1965); Bulgarian Decree No. 514, art. 9 (as amended Oct. 10 & Oct. 31, 1951);
Regulation on the Security of the Maritime Border of the German Democratic
Republic, para. 3, § 5 (Dec. 30, 1961); Law on the Stay of Foreign Warships in the
Waters of the German Democratic Republic, para. 1, § 1 (Aug. 11, 1965); Territo-
rial Waters and the Continental Shelf of the People's Republic of Southern
Yemen Law, art. 17 (1970); Polish Order of the Minister of the People's Defense
on the Conditions of Stay of Foreign Warships in the Internal Waters, The
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, para. 2, point 1 (Mar. 29, 1957); Soma-
lian Law No. 37, art. 1 (Sept. 10, 1972); Statute for the Protection of the U.S.S.R.,
art. 16, para. 1 (Aug. 5, 1960); Spain's Act No. 25/64 concerning Nuclear Energy,
art. 2, 69-77, 79, 80 (Apr. 29, 1964); Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Act
No. 106 of Sudan, ch. I, § 8 (1970); Syrian Legislative Decree No. 304, art. 12 (Dec.
28, 1963). At last count this list contained 15 to 20 States. See letter from Robert
D. Hodgson, Director of the Office of the Geographer, United States Depart-
ment of State, to Lawrence W. Kaye (Sept. 15, 1977) (on file with the San Diego
Law Review).
63. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 140.
[Low-level notification] means the naval attach6 telephoning a lieuten-
ant commander at the local Navy Office to say, "Oh, by the way, H.M.S.
So-and-so will be passing. . ." and giving details. On the whole, most
coastal States have been cautious about striking attitudes on the ques-
tion, and those that have, like Somalia or Bangladesh, which have sol-
emnly proclaimed ... that warships shall not pass without permission,
are imitating their mentors and have been loftily ignored by others.
After all, even a half a dozen swallows do not make a summer.
Id.
64. 1 V. SEBEK, supra note 21, at 303-04.
[Their] attitudes] [are] understandable in view of numerous incidents
which were provoked by the presence of foreign warships in [their]
territorial seas .... Albania has never forgotten the bitter lesson of the
Corfu Channel Case. The U.S.S.R. also had unpleasant memories of the
activities of foreign naval vessels which supported in the Baltic and the
Black Sea, the counterrevolutionary forces during the Soviet civil war.
The presence of foreign warships in the Adriatic during the Trieste
crisis was also resented in Yugoslavia, and those memories were revived
during the most recent tension between Yugoslavia and Italy because of
the border dispute in March 1974. Incidents... have also taken place in
the territorial seas of Bulgaria and the GDR.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Other nations, some of which do not yet insist upon advance warn-
ing of the passage of warships, strongly endorse the requirement. For
instance, Cyprus, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, the Philip-
pines, Spain and Jordan submitted to the United Nations subcom-
mittee II of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor in 1973 Draft Articles on Naviga-
tion Through the Territorial Sea Including Straits Used for Interna-
tional Navigation. 65 The relevant provisions are as follows:
Article 15
1. The coastal State may require prior notification to or authoriza-
tion by its competent authorities for the passage through its territorial
sea of foreign nuclear-powered ships or ships carrying nuclear
weapons, in conformity with regulations in force in such a State.
Article 21
The coastal State may require prior notification to or authorization
by its competent authorities for the passage of foreign warships
through its territorial sea ....
Article 22
1. Foreign warships exercising the right of innocent passage shall
comply with the laws and regulations enacted by the coastal State in
conformity with these articles and other rules of international law.
2. Foreign warships... shall not perform any activity which does
not have a direct bearing with the passage, such as:
(a) Carrying out any exercise or practice with weapons of any
kind;
(b) Assuming combat position by the crew;
(c) Flying their aircraft;
(d) Intimidation or displaying of force;
(e) Carrying out any research operations of any kind.
3. Foreign warships... may be required to pass through certain sea
lanes as may be designated for this purpose by the coastal State.6
The Draft Articles are illustrative of some important trends. In
general, the issue of warship passage, which was thought to be rela-
tively simple in 1958, has become more complex. The onslaught of
nuclear-powered vessels and other technological advancements in
the building of military craft demand new rules. Moreover, the in-
creasing tension and near xenophobia of coastal States over the
"free" passage of warships is readily apparent. The limitations im-
posed by these articles would tend to prohibit warship transit. This
possibility is by no means unintended, nor is it the result of sloppy
draftsmanship. One might cynically suggest that the mere passage of
warships, on its face, is an "[i]ntimidation or displaying of force.16 7
65. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC.I IL. 18 (1973), reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATE-
RLALS 573 (1973).
66. Id., reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 573, 578, 579-80.
67. Id., art. 22(2)(d), reprinted in 12 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 573, 580.
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But others would argue that there is a pressing need to curb harass-
ment by the world's superpowers.
The unilateral practices of many States, although extreme, reveal
the dire need for a compromise or balance between exclusive coastal
interests and the community goal of free navigation. But the proba-
bility that such a balance will be achieved has been overshadowed
by more recent developments. In fact, the right of warship passage is
seriously threatened by coastal claims to wider territorial seas.
THE EXPANDING TERRITORiAL SEAS AND THE
PLIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE
Territorial Seas and International Traffic: Two Incompatible
Concepts?
In 1958 nations customarily claimed jurisdiction over a three-mile
territorial sea.68 Hence, the controversy over innocent passage was
geographically confined to a relatively small area. However, the
modern trend to expand the breadth of the territorial sea presents a
direct threat to the "rights" the United States believes were recog-
nized by the 1958 Convention.69
The regime of territorial waters is sovereignty-based. It is not
inconceivable, therefore, that extensive claims will be formulated by
the coastal State to regulate or exclude shipping completely.70 "It is a
short step from excluding fishing vessels [for pollution and conserva-
tion purposes] to excluding all ships, even without any reformulation
of the nature of the exclusive claim."71 Several developments illumi-
nate this point.
Peru, in 1952, claimed exclusive fisheries jurisdiction in a 200-mile
offshore zone.7 2 This claim unjustly became the purported basis for
68. 4 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 2, at 14-18.
69. Brock, Threats to Freedom of Navigation, 24 NAVY JAG J. 75 (Dec. 1969-
Jan. 1970). See also W. BuRKE, CONTsPoRARY LAW OF THE SEA: TRANSPORTA-
TION, CommncAToN AND FIGHT 13 (Law of the Sea Inst., U. of R.I., Occasional
Paper No. 28, 1975); Deddish, The Right of Innocent Passage by Warships
Through International Straits, 24 NAVY JAG J. 79 (Dec. 1969-Jan. 1970). Mr.
Deddish comments: "Today, at a time when technological capabilities permit
the deployment of fleets to the most distant waters, legal impediments to the
free and unrestricted movement of warships about the high seas loom ominous-
ly on the horizon." Id.
70. Warbrick, The Regulation of Navigation, in III NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA 137, 146 (R. Churchill, K. Simmonds, & J. Welch eds. 1973).
71. Id.
72. After meeting with other Latin American States at Santiago to enter into
a multilateral agreement, Peru enacted her own internal legislation. See 1952
the later arrest of the Onassis Whaling Fleet. The vessels were simply
engaged in transit to whaling grounds located outside Peruvian wa-
ters.7 In reality, the arrest had nothing whatever to do with fishing,
and there was no identifiable violation of Peruvian law.
74
Canada, in 1970, purported through internal legislation to subject
100 miles of coastal sea to pollution control.75 American jurists and
politicians feared that such a unilateral declaration would create
unwarranted interference with the right of innocent passage.
76
Similarly, the United States is alarmed by the restrictions of
Malaysia and Indonesia on shipping in their territorial waters on the
grounds of pollution control. 77 Warships, because of their excessive
weight, are to be excluded completely.
78
Declaration on the Maritime Zone, Res. Leg. No. 12305 (Nov. 1952), reprinted in
12 REVISTA PERUANA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 244-46 (1952). Chile, Ecuador
and Peru asserted "sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction to a minimum dis-
tance of 200 nautical miles ... ." Id.
73. J. COLOMBOS, supra note 5, at 98.
The claim of Peru to this extended sovereignty of waters was enforced
in November 1954 when Peruvian naval and air units seized Mr. Onas-
sis's five whaling vessels led by The Olympic Challenger and flying the
Panamanian flag. Two of these ships were captured at a distance of
approximately 160 miles off the Peruvian coast; whilst the remaining
three.., were attacked 300 and 364 miles respectively off the coast.
Id.
74. Id. "The Peruvian Court ... supported the validity of these seizures
under the Peruvian decrees of 1952 and [demanded].. . a fine of three million
dollars within five days." Id. See also Warbrick, The Regulation of Navigation,
in III NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 137, 146 (R. Churchill, K. Sim-
monds, & J. Welch eds. 1973).
75. See Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, CAN. REV. STAT., c. 2 (1st
Supp. 1970); Canada Shipping Act, id., c. 38; Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones
Amendment Act, id., c. 45.
76. See Department of State Statement on Government of Canada's Bills on
Limits of the Territorial Sea, Fisheries, and Pollution, reprinted in 9 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 605 (1970).
Within these zones, Canada would assert the right to control all ship-
ping, to prescribe standards of vessel construction, navigation and oper-
ation, and to prohibit, if Canada deemed it necessary, the free passage
of vessels in those waters .... [The United States is] concerned that this
action by Canada if not opposed by us would be taken as precedent in
other parts of the world for other unilateral infringements on the free-
dom of the seas. If Canada had the right to claim and exercise exclusive
pollution and resources jurisdiction in the high seas, other countries
could assert the right to exercise jurisdiction for other purposes, some
reasonable and some not, but all equally invalid according to interna-
tional law.
Id.
77. Warbrick, The Regulation of Navigation, in III NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA 137, 146 (R. Churchill, K. Simmonds, & J. Welch eds. 1973).
These restrictions only apply, however, in the Straits of Malacca. Id.
78. Id. The author notes that "[a]n alternative passage for very deep-draught
vessels would be allowed through the Straits of Maccassar, but there would be
no right of... passage here either, because this involves crossing the waters of
the Indonesian archipelago, which Indonesia regards as internal waters." Id.
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Not all the claims to extend maritime jurisdiction involve neces-
sary interference with shipping, as do those of Canada, Malaysia and
Indonesia. But the tendency of these other claims is toward the same
result. South American countries have been notorious for declara-
tions of vaguely unlimited jurisdiction in 200 miles of coastal wa-
ters.79 As of September 1, 1977, 31 out of 129 independent coastal
States had claimed territorial seas in excess of twelve nautical
miles.80 Fourteen States now claim jurisdictional competence 200
nautical miles from shore.8 1 Sixty States have established the moder-
ate maximum of twelve nautical miles.
82
These statistics certainly contravene the three-mile territorial sea
limit which was customary in 1958. In addition, States are seeking to
increase their sovereignty over broad seas they have already claimed.
The emerging infringments upon worldwide navigation were sug-
gested by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger:
We will not join in an agreement which leaves any uncertainty about
the right to use world communication routes without interference.
Within two hundred miles of the shore are sdme of the world's most
important fishing grounds as well as substantial deposits of petrole-
um, natural gas, and minerals. This has led some coastal states to seek
full sovereignty over this zone. These claims ... are unacceptable to
the United States. To accept them would bring 30 percent of the
oceans under national territorial control-in the very areas through
which most of the world's shipping travels.83
Attempts to exclude shipping from wide territorial seas, either
through strict pollution standards or through requirements of notice-
authorization, necessarily portend a loss of communication and
transit. These traditional freedoms are vital to the peaceful existence
of the civilized world. Even the earlier publicists recognized that
"such use should not be denied in time of peace when the territorial
waters are so placed that passage through them is necessary for
international traffic. '8 4 If international sea lanes fall under the aus-
79. See Declaration of Montevideo on the Law of the Sea, done at Mon-
tevideo, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1081 (1970); Declaration of the
Latin American States on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/28 (1970),
reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 207-14 (1971).
80. Bulletin of the Office of the Geographer of the United States State De-
partment (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Address to the American Bar Association in Montreal, Canada (Aug. 11,
1975), reprinted in McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 113, 118 (1976).
84. J. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 114 (4th ed. 1958).
pices of coastal regulation, and the concept of innocent passage is
narrowly applied, warship mobility throughout the world will be
adversely affected.
Submarines: An Example of Overt Restrictions on Mobility
The development of the law relating to the innocent passage of
submarines clearly illustrates the present danger to international
warship traffic. The 1958 Convention states that "[s]ubmarines are
required-to navigate on the surface and to show their flag." 5 There
were ample reasons for this provision when the three-mile territorial
sea limit prevailed. Submerged transit would mean that the coastal
State had no notice or knowledge of a presence of these vessels in the
territorial sea.86 As a result, submarines could be stationed within
territorial waters and could conceivably use the area for espionage,
reconnaissance, and for moving between external points.87 Little
justification existed for submarines insisting upon submerged pas-
sage. The security interests of the coastal State greatly outweighed
any prejudice to foreign powers.
Today the rule is the object of much criticism. Where States now
claim 200-mile territorial seas, they also assert the right to forbid
submerged passage. 88 The United States Navy is alerted and some-
what alarmed:
The vastness of the areas in which global deployment of submarines
can be affected has scarcely been realized. All the access routes to
Cape Horn are covered by 200-mile claims, and the South American
navies, with the latest detection equipment, the Ikara anti-submarine
missile system and the predisposition to use force against unidentified
submerged contacts, can only complicate the naval planning of the
Great Powers who may use this route.89
The necessity to destroy a submerged submarine up to 200 miles
from shore is an unwarranted exaggeration of a State's security
needs. Yet, violation of the surface navigation requirement today is
deemed a grave infringement upon a State's sovereignty and interna-
tional custom."0 The measures of enforcement are disconcertingly
strict and include the right to destroy a submerged vessel upon
contact. 91 Nations with this attitude assume that disregard of the rule
85. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note 1,
art. 14(6).
86. W. BuRKE, supra note 69, at 12.
87. Id. See also W. BUTLER, supra note 19, at 65.
88. D. O'CoNNELL, supra note 16, at 142.
89. Id. at 142.
90. W. BUTLER, supra note 19, at 65.
91. 1 V. SEBEK, supra note 21, at 308. "In accordance with Article 8, paragraph
3 of the Romanian Decree No. 39, Article 10, paragraph 2 of the Bulgarian 1951
Decree, and an Instruction by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, reported in Pray-
[VOL. 15: 573, 1978] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
against submerged transit a fortiori renders passage not innocent.
But when speaking of a 200-mile territorial sea, this assumption is
analogous to the idea that "excessive speed on the road makes the
journey illegal. 92
Certainly, the likelihood of submerged passage being non-innocent
was greater when territorial seas were narrow. Indeed, shallow
coastal waters are far more hazardous and submerged transit would
imply ulterior motives.93 But far out at sea, submerged passage may
be more convenient, and in adverse weather, entirely necessary to
avoid damage.
94
Perhaps this concern for submarine safety can be satisfied in
"ways more consonant with coastal interests than simply providing
for unannounced submerged passage by large nuclear powered ves-
sels carrying nuclear weapons." 95 Again, a balancing of coastal secu-
rity and international navigational needs is most desirable. The
policies of the Soviet Union and the United States have become
similar in this regard.96 Unfortunately, the argument of the super-
powers in favor of submerged passage has been prejudiced by their
past suspicious activities.
9 7
A Suggested Solution: The Lesson to be Learned from Straits
As States claim broader territorial seas, it will be necessary for
more foreign vessels to pass through sovereign waters. In many in-
da of August 29, 1961, submarines which violate this rule are to be pursued and
destroyed without liability." Id.
92. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 142.
93. Id. at 143.
94. Id. at 142-43. See also W. BURKE, supra note 69, at 12.
95. W. BURKE, supra note 69, at 12.
96. See generally D. O'CoNNELL, supra note 16, at 140, 142.
97. According to recent reports, U.S. submarines are employed for mis-
sions which call for stations within claimed twelve-mile territorial seas,
but beyond three miles. The New York Times report by Seymour M.
Hersch described these missions as follows: "The Holystone operation,
which more recently has carried the code names Pinnacle and Bollard,
involves the use of specifically equipped, electronic submarines to spy
inside the waters of the Soviet Union and other nations. The intelligence
gathering operation was initiated in the early nineteen-sixties." N.Y.
Times July 6, 1975.
W. BURKE, supra note 69, at 12. See also 1 V. SEBEK, supra note 25, at 308-09,
citing Hersch, Navy Said to Falsify Report of U.S.-Soviet Sub Collision, Int'l
Herald Tribune (July 7, 1975).
In November, 1969, the submarine USS Gato collided with a Soviet
Submarine in an area 15 to 25 miles off the entrance to the White Sea...
[T]his incident occurred only one mile from the [Soviet] Shore. The U.S.
Navy... falsified [the reports] to show that the damage was caused by a
propeller shaft malfunction.
stances the territorial seas of coastal States now overlap internation-
al high seas transit routes.9 8 Few waters may remain in the world
which have not yet been appropriated by coastal States and which
can still be transited as operational seas.9  Hence, a growing analogy
between the use of international straits'01 and territorial waters has
emerged.
Traditionally a State has been forbidden to refuse passage through
an international strait within its domain. The Report of the Second
Commission (Territorial Sea) of the 1930 Hague Conference included
the provision that "under no pretext. . . may there be any interfer-
ence with the passage of warships through straits constituting a
route for international maritime traffic between two parts of the high
seas."''1 1 The Corfu Channel Case was a further indication that the
right to send warships through such waterways is paramount to
restrictions imposed by the local sovereignty. In addition, the 1958
Convention provides that "[t]here shall be no suspension of the inno-
cent passage of foreign ships through [international straits] .. ."102
A major policy underlying these limits on State jurisdiction in
straits is freedom of navigation. 103 Because warship transit through
coastal territorial waters a mere three miles from shore was not
normally "necessary," the freedom of navigation argument would
not apply in that zone.
But the interest of a State in denying transit freedom to warships
up to 200 miles from its coast is highly questionable. The fact that
warship passage through a three-mile coastal zone was rarely a
necessity should not provide license for States to apply the same
restrictions today, when asserting larger boundaries. Although "free-
dom of navigation" in narrow territorial seas may have sounded
98. See D. O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 142.
99. Id., at 141.
[Tiry as one may to distinguish the case of straits and the territorial
sea, the one persists in remaining an analogue of the other, and in the
sea lanes of south-east Asia they shade into each other so that they
virtually overlap. The proliferation of broad claims to the sea portends
the exclusion of warships from enormous operational areas. Admiral
Gorshkov [Soviet Red Fleet] himself has calculated that if all countriesdeclared a 200-mile territorial sea, then of the 360 million square kilome-
ters of water on our planet about 140-150 million would be appropriated
by the coastal states ....
Id.
100. For a definition of an international strait, see note 38 supra.
101. League of Nations Doc. C. 230.M.117.1930 V., at 10, reprinted in 4 M.
WmTEmAN, supra note 2, at 411.
102. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, supra note
1, art. 16(4).
103. See text accompanying notes 104 & 106 infra.
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contrived, the doctrine should apply with full vigor in areas tradi-
tionally designated as high seas.0 4
The United States has recently proposed a new theory to protect
navigation through international straits: 05
We believe the right to transit straits should be regarded in law for
what it is in fact: an inherent and inseparable adjunct of the freedoms
of navigation and overflight on the high seas themselves. Without such
a right of transit, these high seas freedoms would lose much of their
meaning if an expansion of the territorial sea to 12 miles is to be
recognized and agreed.10 6
The United States delegate to the Third Conference on the Law of
the Sea has not seized upon the analogy between territorial waters
and straits. In its obsession over straits, the United States has tended
to ignore the preservation of innocent passage for warships in foreign
territorial seas. Accurately stated, the argument is that "[i]f warships
have such rights generally they have them specifically in straits
.... 11107 However, the issue could not popularly be presented in the
United Nations in this way due to the ambiguous history of warships
and because innocent passage through the territorial sea is not a
sufficient guarantee of freedom of naval deployment through
104. "Freedom of navigation" is a concept which originated in regard to the
high seas. It is one of the enumerated high seas freedoms in the Convention on
the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. 82. Article 2, which defines "freedom of the seas," states that "[i]t
comprises inter alia,. . . (1) Freedom of navigation ......
105. U.S. Draft Articles on Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries Submitted
to U.N. Seabeds Committee, art. 2, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1013,
1018 (1971) (United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction).
106. Id., reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1013, 1014 (1971) (statement
of John R. Stevenson, legal advisor of the Department of State and United
States representative to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction).
The "right of unimpeded transit" to which Mr. Stevenson alluded is an entirely
new concept which would, according to the United States, avoid the limitations
of the present concept of innocent passage. The right implies that ships passing
through international straits would have the same rights of navigation as they
do on the high seas. The proposal "is notable for being the first attempt to
extend rather than merely resist encroachment upon, the right of [freedom] of
navigation... ." since the 1958 Convention. Warbrick, The Regulation of Navi-
gation, in III NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 137, 146 (R. Churchill, K.
Simmonds, & J. Welch eds. 1973) (emphasis original). Unfortunately, the
proposal only directs itself to passage through straits. There are no United
States proposals concerning transit rights in the territorial seas.
107. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 138.
straits.10 8 The tendency therefore has been to view the problem of
straits as having a special character and "to suppress the question of
the territorial sea as likely only to compound the controversy.' 10 9
Nevertheless, it must be realized that if the United States
continues to ignore the subtle harassment of its warships far out at
sea, the effect will be tantamount to a denial of transit through
straits. The great naval power may also forever forfeit the "right" of
innocent passage in the territorial sea by inadvertent acquiescence.
Implications for United States Defense Tactics
Freedom to transit the world's waterways is not the sole justifica-
tion for United States ocean policy. "[M]any nations, including the
United States, depend upon air and sea mobility in order to guaran-
tee . . . individual and collective self-defense. To contemplate
changes in the law of the sea that might reduce that mobility is to
contemplate changes affecting fundamental security interests
',110
No country wishes to subject its defense status and sea communi-
cation to the consent or political good will of another State."' Al-
though the United States recognizes that the peace, good order, and
security of coastal States is to be preserved, these interests must be
balanced against every nation's right to maintain a naval fleet and a
system of defense. The United States is adamant in suppressing
purported interference with its role as guardian of world peace.112
Sea power means more than just ships and aircraft deployed across
the seas-it means the ability, vital to the United States and our allies,
to use the seas to the best interests of the free world, while denying
their use to any potential enemy 13
The freedom to navigate upon the high seas is an essential presup-
position to the fulfillment of the U.S. Navy's mission .... 14
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. U.S. Draft Articles on Territorial Sea, Straits, and Fisheries Submitted
to U.N. Seabeds Committee, reprinted in 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1013, 1014
(1971) (statement of John R. Stevenson, legal advisor of the Department of State
and United States representative to the United Nations Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction).
111. Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1974).
112. See Hearings on National Marine Sciences Program Before the Sub-
comm. on Oceanography, House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 345 (1967) (testimony of Dr. A. Frosch, Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Research and Development)).
113. Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1960 NAvY JAG J. 16 (Jun.
1960).
114. Brock, Threats to Freedom of Navigation, 24 NAvY JAG J. 75 (Dec. 1969-
Jan. 1970).
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Integrally related to the effectiveness of a defense program is the
United States' need for secrecy as to the location of vessels of war.
The importance of secrecy of the location of missile-carrying sub-
marines, for example, has increased since the arms-limitation agree-
ments with the Soviet Union.115 American naval officials fear that
with the emergence of Russian military strength on the seas,116 there
is a danger that prior notice-authorization restrictions will destroy
our strategic advantage.117
Clearly, the trend toward territorial sea expansion also has an
impact on United States defense tactics because it is an even more
onerous restriction on naval deployment. Rear Admiral Wilfred A.
Hearn, former Judge Advocate General of the Navy and Department
of Defense Representative on the Law of the Sea, definitively ex-
pressed the view of the military in this regard:
We consider it imperative from the standpoint of security to preserve
the right of freedom of navigation on the high seas for warships and
aircraft. We believe that our security interests are best served when
nations are limited to narrow territorial seas which interfere only
slightly with this freedom of navigation.118
Finally, an inability to remain mobile on the seas would be injuri-
ous and impractical to the United States. Serious restrictions would
ultimately result in even more intimidation for other nations. Mobili-
ty prevents the necessity of having to post large forces for extended
periods near potential trouble spots. 1 9
115. Warbrick, The Regulation of Navigation, in III NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
LAW OF THE SEA 137, 146 (R. Churchill, K. Simmonds, & J. Welch eds. 1973).
116. See, e.g., Burke, Defense Problems Start with the Threat We Face, 1960
NAVY JAG J. 20 (May 1960). See also Palmer, Territorial Sea Agreement-Key
to Progress in the Law of the Sea, 25 NAvY JAG J. 69, 78 (Dec. 1970-Jan. 1971).
117. See generally Burke, Defense Problems Start with the Threat We Face,
1960 NAVY JAG J. 20 (May 1960). Admiral Burke comments:
Thus our desires are not their desires; our needs are not their needs
and our military requirements are not their military requirements....
[Blallistic missiles can hit anything that stays in one place, once its
location is known. On the other hand, ballistic missiles cannot hit any-
thing that keeps moving or whose location is unknown. When the loca-
tion of anything is known, its address can be put into a ballistic missile.Xcd.
118. Harlow, Legal Aspects of Claims to Jurisdiction in Coastal Waters, 23
NAVY JAG J. 81,88 (Dec. 1968-Jan. 1969). Rear Admiral Hearn had been asked to
testify "in June 1966 before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conser-
vation of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries of the House of
Representatives on H.R. 9530, H.R. 9531, and H.R. 14961." Id.
119. Burke, Defense Problems Start with the Threat We Face, 1960 NAVY
JAG J. (May 1960).
A CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES' PosITION:
"Do WHAT I SAY, NOT WHAT I Do"
The arguments propounded by the United States urging removal of
restrictions on innocent passage are weakened by their visible hypoc-
racies. Nations with newfound voices point to the embarassing dis-
crepancy between enunciated American policy and actual practice.
For instance, following the United States' condemnation of Canada's
Pollution Act the Canadian government noted that:
The position of the United States Government is that waters beyond a
three-mile limit are high seas and that no state has a right to exercise
... jurisdiction ... beyond a three-mile territorial sea .... [Tihe
United States itself does not adhere to [this view] in practice. For
example, as early as 1790, at a time when the international norm for
the breadth of the territorial sea was without question three miles, the
United States claimed jurisdiction up to twelve miles for customs
purposes and enacted appropriate enforcement legislation, which is
still in force. Since 1935 the United States has claimed the authority to
extend customs enforcement activities as far out to sea as 62 miles, in
clear contradiction of applicable international law. In 1966, the United
States established exclusive fisheries jurisdiction beyond its three-
mile territorial sea extending out to twelve miles from shore.... ."120
The United States continues to impose a variety of complicated
restrictions on the passage of foreign ships, while contesting the
legality of a notice-authorization restriction on warships. Does the
United States believe that it is the only country which can extend its
territorial sea in "good faith"?
Mr. Kissinger gracefully admitted that the United States has now
joined the ranks of countries urging agreement on a 200-mile
offshore economic zone. 121 He assures us that "under this proposal
. . .freedom of navigation and other rights of the international
community would be preserved.' 12 2 However, the United States has
always condemned these kinds of proposals because of the fear of
greater coastal State interference with shipping. This history is
When international tensions mount we get an even greater number of
carriers, more aircraft and other ships to sea. We keep them moving,
thus low in vulnerability .... These forces stress mobility. They stress it
because mobility allows us to get adequate military strength where
needed, when needed.
Id.
120. Summary of Canadian Note of April 16, Tabled by the Secretary of State
for External Affairs in the House April 17, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATE-
RiALS 607, 607-08 (1970).
121. See Henry Kissinger's Address to the American Bar Association in
Montreal, Canada (Aug. 11, 1975), reprinted in McDowell, Contemporary Prac-
tice of the United States Relating to International Law, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 113,
118 (1976). In 1976 the United States enacted appropriate legislation to create
and enforce a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. See United States Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976).
122. McDowell, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 113, 118 (1976).
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clearly inconsistent with our own present policy. What assurances do
Third World nations have that the United States will not derogate
the right of innocent passage in its own territorial waters based on an
extension of sovereignty?
Moreover, no guarantee exists that the "right" of innocent passage
will not be utilized by great naval powers to intimidate and dominate
the globe. The purported defense motives of the United States for
preserving such a right have been severely criticized.12 3
In light of such hostile attitudes, it will be virtually impossible to
reach unanimous agreement on the question of innocent passage.
Conflicting ideologies appear to doom recent attempts to reformulate
the law of the sea.
THE EMERGING REGIME: UNCLOS III
Delegates from 147 nations have convened at the Third United
Nations Conference (UNCLOS Ill) to clarify and codify the law of
the sea.124 The principal result of the second substantive conference,
held at Geneva, was the production of the Informal Single
Negotiated Text (ISNT).125 This document was the forerunner to the
123. See, e.g., Speech by An Chin-Yuan, Representative of the People's Re-
public of China, at the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (Mar. 3, 1972), reprinted
in 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 654, 655-57 (1972). An Chin-Yuan, speaking on
behalf of the People's Republic of China, vehemently attacked American ocean
politics which he claimed were symptomatic of imperialism:
After World War II, the United States attempted to dominate the world
and increasingly extended its activities from the sea surface to the sea-
bed and carried out expansion over vast areas .... It dispatched its
warships and vessels everywhere to intrude into the territorial seas and
plunder the sea-bed resources of other countries and even commit out-
right armed intervention and aggression .... [O]nly the superpowers
have the final say, while the other one hundred and scores of countries
in the world can only submissively obey .... Can this be "international
law!" It is a crude violation of the principle of state sovereignty. It is
imperialistic logic, pure and simple.
Id.
124. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has
completed five substantive sessions. A sixth session was scheduled to convene
in the spring of 1977. L.A. Times, Sept. 18, 1976, pt. I, at 9, col. 5. The sixth session
was recently held and completed in New York (23 May to 15 July 1977). See
Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62fWP. 10 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as ICNT].
125. U.N. Doc. AConf. 621WP. 8 (1975). This session was held at Geneva from
March 26 to May 10, 1975. Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L.
763 (1975).
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Revised Single Negotiated Text (RSNT).126 The most recent source
for progress on a new Law of the Sea is the Informal Composite
Negotiating Text (ICNT).127 These texts have no official status other
than "serving as a basis for continued negotiation without prejudice
to the right of any delegation to move any amendments or to in-
troduce any new proposals."'1 28
Although not binding, the texts are clear indications of growing
international custom. They are in form strikingly similar to the 1958
Convention and are therefore easily compared.
Initially important is the fact that the ICNT, at least with regard to
innocent passage, 12 9 is a verbatim reiteration of the RSNT, which was
substantially identical to the earlier ISNT. This observation lends
credence to the idea that nations will eventually agree on the provi-
sions embodied in these draft treaties. To find many of the provisions
of these texts in the eventual treaty would not be surprising.13
A summary of the multitude of proposals submitted prior to the
compilation of the negotiated texts is not the goal of this Comment.
Overall dissatisfaction with the 1958 regime on innocent passage is
evident, and a myriad of draft articles call for a new conception of
this term.13 1 The primary thrust for revision is to specifically enumer-
ate those activities in the territorial sea which prejudice the interests
of the coastal State. 32
Every provision of the 1958 Convention concerning innocent pas-
sage also appears in the ICNT. The change has been to redefine the
concept at length in clear and seemingly unambiguous language. The
new text provides in Article 19 that passage shall not be innocent
where a foreign vessel engages in:
(a) Any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) Any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
126. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8/Rev. (1976).
127. ICNT, note 124 supra.
128. Note by the President of the Conference, Revised Single Negotiating
Text, U.N. Doc. AIConf. 62/WP. 8 Rev. (1976).
129. The ICNT is divided into three parts, Part II of which deals with the
territorial sea and contiguous zone. This part was originally drafted by the
President of the Second Subcommittee of the Conference as requested by the
Conference President. See id..
130. Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 764 (1975).
131. W. BuRKE, R. LEGATSKi, & W. WOODHEAD, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE OcEAN 94 (1975).
132. Id.
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(c) Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the
defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or securi-
ty of the coastal State;
(e) The launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) The launching, landing or taking on board of any military
device;
(g) The embarking or disembarking of any commodity, currency
or person contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations of the coastal State;
(h) Any act of wilful and serious pollution, contrary to the present
Convention;
(i) Any fishing activities;
G) The carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) Any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communica-
tion or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(1) Any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.133
Military security of the coastal State is the principal emphasis in
this "open-ended" list of prejudicial activities. 3 4 Although it is cer-
tainly desirable to obtain a clear definition of "innocence," these
provisions arguably increase the ability of coastal States to produce
grounds for denying passage. "Any other activity not having a direct
bearing on passage" under category 1 would certainly be simple for
such nations to manufacture. In this sense, warship passage may be
in serious peril. Consequently, criticism has been aimed at deleting
category I for purposes of specificity and protection of the right.
13 5
Another field in which the ICNT elaborates on the 1958 Conven-
tion is a State's ability to prescribe laws and regulations in its ter-
ritorial sea. The broad regulatory powers of the 1958 Convention,
133. ICNT, supra note 124, art. 19(2).
134. W. BuRKE, R. LEGATSKI, & W. WOODHEAD, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE OcEAN 94, 96 (1975).
135. Dissatisfaction with the 1958 definition of innocent passage appears
sufficiently widespread to assure that a new law of the sea convention
will effect some improvement. The direction is toward a more explicit
understanding of what constitutes passage that is prejudicial to coastal
interests and accordingly what passage is innocent and also toward a
more precise identification of coastal competence to legislate for events
in the territorial sea. On the former point the Single Text would be
measurably improved by removing the catch-all category of "any other
activity not having a direct bearing on passage."
W. BURKE, supra note 69, at 21. Conversely, it may be argued that category I of
the ICNT is not harmful. After giving an extensive list of non-innocent activities,
the ICNT leaves little room, if any, for a coastal State to use category I to the
disadvantage of warships.
Article 23, were cause for much controversy over the legality of
notice-authorization. Today, a State is deemed competent to enact
rules under Article 21 of the ICNT relating particularly to:
(a) The safety of navigation and the regulation of marine traffic;
(b) The protection of navigational aids and facilities and other
facilities or installations;
(c) The protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) The conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) The prevention of infringement of the fisheries regulations of
the coastal State;
(f) The preservation of the environment of the coastal State and
the prevention, reduction and control of pollution thereof;
(g) Marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) The prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigra-
tion, or sanitary regulations of the coastal State."36
In addition, the State is required to "give due publicity to all such
laws and regulations" made by it. 3'
These provisions do not specifically license a State to impose a
notice-authorization prerequisite to innocent passage. Furthermore,
unlike Article 19, the list in Article 21 is exhaustive and exclusive.
States may enact only those laws which are within the ambit of the
listed categories. Thus, there is a strong argument that henceforth
prior notice-authorization should not be required of foreign vessels
by the coastal State.13
A State can easily restrict or refuse, however, the innocent passage
of warships on other grounds. The claimed right of Malaysia and
Indonesia to exclude warships because of "excessive weight" would
clearly be cognizable under Article 21(1)(f). Prior notice-authoriza-
tion might also be required as a component to other competent
regulations. Permission to pass could be incident, for example, to the
"safety of navigation and the regulation of marine traffic." 139 Much
like Article 19, Article 21 contains the potential for abuse by States
opposed to the passage of warships. Little is achieved, therefore,
136. ICNT, supra note 124, art. 21(1).
137. Id., art. 21(3).
138. It should keep in mind that these provisions apply to "all ships," as
designated in the title to subsection A of § 3 of the ICNT.
139. ICNT, supra note 124, art. 21(1)(a). A State may even have the right to
exclude warship passage completely on this ground alone. Article 22(2) provides
that "nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently
dangerous or noxious substances or materials may be required to confine their
passage . . ." as the coastal State "may designate or prescribe. . . ." Id., art.
22(1). There is nothing to prevent a State from claiming that no safe route for
such vessels exists. Likewise, a sea lane maybe designated which is so utterly
inconvenient that the request to use it would be tantamount to a refusal of
passage.
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beyond the provisions of the 1958 Convention. Many of the old ambi-
guities, and unfortunately some new ones, inhere in a discussion of
the coastal State's authority to regulate innocent passage.
Article 23 of the ICNT singles out "[f]oreign nuclear-powered ships
and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious
substances" for special treatment. These vessels must "carry docu-
ments and observe special precautionary measures established for
such ships by international agreements."'140 This provision does not
merely facilitate the imposition of notice-authorization; it also tends
to apply particularly to military vessels.
The sole provision of the ICNT which attempts to safeguard the
interests of the international community is Article 24:
1. The coastal State shall not hamper the innocent passage of foreign
ships through the territorial sea except in accordance with the present
Convention. In particular, in the application of the present Conven-
tion or of any laws or regulations made under the present Convention,
the coastal State shall not:
(a) Impose requirements on foreign ships which have the practical
effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent passage; or
(b) Discriminate in form or in fact against the ships of any State or
against ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State.14'
A requirement of prior notice-authorization, because it impedes
the exercise of innocent passage, would have the "practical effect" of
"denying" or "impairing" this right.142 And for countries, such as the
United States, which rely on secrecy of naval deployment, that rea-
soning is persuasive. Hopefully, Article 24 will become a useful tool
with which to balance coastal and community interests while curb-
ing abuse in the regulation of innocent passage.
One of the greatest benefits of the ICNT is that "[e]very State [now]
has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit
not exceeding 12 nautical miles ... 143 Because unilateral claims to
extend territorial seas and to impose strict shipping regulations have
posed major threats to warship traffic, western jurists were obvious-
ly pleased with this limitation. Indeed, "[a] twelve-mile territorial
140. Id., art. 23.
141. Id., art. 24(1).
142. This argument assumes that warships do possess a fundamental right of
innocent passage. Section 3, subsection A of the ICNT applies to "all ships," and
Article 17 thereunder clearlybestows the "right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea."
143. ICNT, supra note 124, art. 3.
sea and transit passage rights through the straits [continue] to re-
ceive broad support from the delegates."'44
AN IIVIPASSE ON WARSHIP PASSAGE
In recent years, the Soviet Union, which had been the leading
opponent of the right of warship passage, has gradually "defected"
from this camp. The emergence of the Red Fleet as a superpower has
no doubt influenced Soviet ocean politics. In fact, the Soviet Union
has become a major naval, merchant marine and fishing nation. 146
With this new status there has evolved the realization of the need to
protect traditional high seas freedoms.146 The political split which
was the downfall of the 1958 Convention is not present at the new
Law of the Sea Conference. 147
Russia has no desire to have the Red Fleet "landlocked" between
foreign jurisdictional boundaries. The Soviet bloc has therefore re-
sisted territorial sea claims exceeding twelve miles.148 But because
this resistance might prove ineffective, "it is logical to suppose that
the Soviet navy has gone cold on the notion that warships may not
transit the territorial sea without previous permission."' 149
At the same time, the positions of the Latin American States have
become steadfast and have broadened in scope.150 China, too, adheres
vehemently to the proposition that warships have no right of inno-
cent passage. The world's most populous nation has proclaimed that
"[a] coastal State may, in accordance with its laws and regulations,
require military ships of foreign States to tender prior notification to,
or seek prior approval from, its competent authorities before passing
through its territorial sea.151
144. Synopsis: Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea, 14 SAN DiEGo L.
REV. 718, 721 (1977).
145. Palmer, Territorial Sea Agreement-Key to Progress in the Law of the
Sea, 25 NAvY JAG J. 69, 78 (Dec. 1970-Jan. 1971).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Draft Articles on the Territorial Sea of the People's Republic of
Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, Polish People's Republic, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/C.2fL.26. UNITED NATIONS
SouRcE DOCUMENTS ON TE THIRD U.N. LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE - CARACAS
'74 (LOS-3) 127 (Ocean Science News 1974). Article 2, which limits the breadth of
the territorial sea to 12 miles, is identical to the provision now included in the
ICNT.
149. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 141. Unlike the Soviet reservation to
Article 23 of the 1958 Convention, the Draft Articles submitted to UNCLOS III
do not claim the right to require previous notice-authorization for the passage
of warships.
150. Palmer, Territorial Sea Agreement-Key to Progress in the Law of the
Sea, 25 NAVY JAG J. 69, 78 (Dec. 1970-Jan. 1971).
151. Note by the Chairman of UNCLOS III: Texts of Proposals Which
Particular Delegations Consider Should be Included in Document
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In short, an impasse has evolved from the tactics at the 1958
Convention and the ongoing negotiations. The crux of the difficulty
is that coastal nations have habitually permitted foreign warships to
transit their territorial seas, yet at the same time they have reserved
the right to prohibit such passage.5 2 Western powers have always
discreetly complied with notice-authorization dictates, but where an
alternative was tenable, foreign nations have not sent their men-of-
war through such waters and have avoided the issue. 5 3 In the few
jurisdictions which could not be so avoided, diplomacy has prevented
major obstacles from arising.15 4
CONCLUSION
The theory of innocent passage for warships presents a complex
and demanding issue for modern jurists. There are persuasive argu-
ments in favor of and opposed to a fundamental right of military
vessels to transit sovereign waterways. In short, the regime of war-
ship passage through territorial waters is a precarious one, subject to
reasonable modification by the coastal State.155
No clear synthesis of law has emerged, nor is there presently a
norm regarding prior notification or authorization. The conflict be-
tween East and West on the issue is not one which lends itself well to
a compromise satisfactory to all.
As nations both powerful and weak continually restructure'them-
selves politically, their roles in the international community change.
The unilateral declarations of many Third World nations clearly
illustrate this point. And the retraction by the Soviet Union of its
earlier position on the innocent passage of warships, along with other
instability in ocean politics, renders the future of that doctrine un-
certain.
A/Conf.62/C.2/WP.1, China: Provision 52, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.IIL.34, para.
1(8), reprinted in THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA-
DOCUMENTS OF THE GENEVA SESSION 1975, at 200,201 (R. Platzbder compiler 1975)
(emphasis added).
152. D. O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 140.
153. Id.
154. Id. "Where they have found it necessary, mainly in the sea lanes of
Indonesia and the Philippines, they handled the matter by diplomatic modal-
ities, which again have kept the problem confined to the theoretical." Id.
155. Corfu Channel Case (United Kindgdom v. Albania) (Merits), [1949]
I.C.J. 4, 101 (Azevedo, J., dissenting).
The key to understanding the issues of innocent passage is in the
"attitudes" of individual States. States with a view toward freedom
of naval deployment for defense purposes will be compelled to recon-
cile this goal with the security needs of their neighbors. Hopefully, a
balance of interests can be struck.
Unfortunately for the United States, the arguments in favor of free
transit passage through straits have not been extended to preserve
freedom of movement in other territorial seas. This is not to say,
however, that the major naval powers are the sole arbitrators of the
law of the sea. Indeed, the texts of UNCLOS III have proved other-
wise.
Upon examining the positions of various nations, one senses an
ever-increasing hostility toward the deployment of foreign warships.
Arguably, the future is gloomy for the principle of innocent passage
as applied to these vessels.
The heroic struggle of Latin American countries to safeguard their
rights over their territorial seas has won the sympathy, admiration
and support of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and
the rest of the world. It has proved once again that so long as small and
weak countries in the world raise their vigilance, persist in struggle,
strengthen their unity and support one another, they will surely win
victory and that the super powers, though looking monstrous, are
nothing terrible and can surely be defeated. 56
LAWRENCE WAYNE KAYE
156. Speech by An Chin-Yuan, Representative of the People's Republic of
China, at the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (Mar. 3, 1972), reprinted in 11
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 654, 656 (1972).
